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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.

:

ERNEST ROBERT MILLER,

:

Case No. 890459-CA

Category No- 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of distribution of a
counterfeit substance, a second degree felony in violation of
Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1986).

The conviction

resulted from a jury trial in the Fifth Judicial District Court,
the Honorable J. Phillip Eves, Judge, presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The sole issue on appeal is whether there was
sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following provisions are pertinent to resolution of
the issues on appeal.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (Supp. 1989)t
Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter,
it is unlawful for any person to knowingly
and intentionally:

(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense;
or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or
counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled substance
in the course of his business as a sales
representative of a manufacturer or
distributor of substances listed in
Schedules II through V except under an
order or prescription; or
(iv) possess a controlled or
counterfeit substance with intent to
distribute,
(b) Any person convicted of violating
Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule
I or II is guilty of a second degree
felony and upon a second or subsequent
conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty
of a first degree felony . . . [.]
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(5) (Supp. 1987)t
"Counterfeit substance" means:
(a) any substance or container or labeling
of any substance that without authorization
bears the trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, number, device, or
any likeness of them, of a manufacturer,
distributor, or dispenser other than the
person or persons who in fact manufactured,
distributed, or dispensed the substance which
falsely purports to be a controlled substance
distributed by, any other manufacturer,
distributor, or dispenser; or
(b) any substance that is represented to
be a controlled substance.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Ernest Robert Miller, was charged with
distribution of a counterfeit substance, a second degree felony,
under Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1989).
12, 1989, a jury found him guilty as charged.
-2-

On May

Defendant was

sentenced to one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
Execution of the sentence was stayed and defendant was placed on
three years probation.

As a condition of probation defendant

served 15 days in the Iron County Jail and was ordered to comply
with other specified probation terms.

Defendant filed his notice

of appeal on July 20, 1989.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of July 20, 1988, Patrick McCarthy, a
\ narcotics agent for the State of Utah, entered the Sportmen's Bar
in Cedar City, Utah, for the purpose of conducting a narcotics
investigation (T. 43). There, by prearrangement, he met a
confidential informant and subsequently approached defendant,
asking if defendant knew anybody in the bar who could procure
some "speed," a slang term for the controlled substance
amphetamine (T. 44-45, 47). Defendant replied that he did not
know anybody at the moment but that he would check around.
Approximately 15 minutes later defendant returned and said to
Agent McCarthy, "I can get you some speed, but all I have are
some cross tops, and they're my own, and they're at my house, and
I can't get them for you until after the bar closes." (T. 47-48).
After the bar closed, at approximately 1:00 a.m., July
21, 1988, Agent McCarthy and the confidential informant followed
defendant to defendant's home where defendant gave them
approximately ten double-scored white tablets.

Defendant did not

charge Agent 'McCarthy for the pills but said that he could sell
Agent McCarthy more at a cost of $20 for 200 (T. 49-51).

Agent McCarthy submitted the pills he had received from
defendant to the Utah State Crime Lab for identification, and it
was determined that they contained no controlled substances.
Defendant subsequently was arrested and charged with distribution
of a counterfeit substance.
At trial Agent McCarthy, who had had 12 years of
experience as a narcotics officer in California and 16 months in
narcotics in Utah, testified concerning the practice of using
slang terms to describe illicit drugs (T. 40, 53-55).

In the

200-300 cases he had worked on involving "speed," the term, when
referring to a substance in tablets form, meant an amphetamine.
Other terms used to describe a tablet form of amphetamine were
"cross tops" and "go fasts." (T. 46, 47, 52). Agent McCarthy
further testified that in his experience the non-controlled
substances ephedrine, pseudoephedrine and caffeine were described
as "speed" only if the person offering such substances was trying
to sell a phony or counterfeit product as an amphetamine (T. 51,
52).

Agent McCarthy also stated that the price quoted to him by

defendant for the purchase of more cross top tablets, 200 for
$20, was a fair price for amphetamines (T. 51).
Kevin Lee Smith, the Utah State Criminologist who
analyzed the tablets received from defendant, testified that when
he receives a white scored tablet for analysis, he checks for
amphetamine.

He stated that ••[i]f there is going to be a

controlled substance in a white scored tablet, it's going to be
amphetamine.

In one case, I found a barbituate in a white

double-scored tablet, but that's an exception" (T. 95, 96). Mr.

-4-

Smith's analysis of the tablets in question indicated that they
contained only ephedrine, a non-controlled substance.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Applying the applicable standards of review, there was
sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of
distribution of a counterfeit substance.
ARGUMENT
THE STATE PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
CONVICT DEFENDANT OF DISTRIBUTION OF A
COUNTERFEIT SUBSTANCE.
Defendant argues that evidence submitted by the State
at trial was insufficient to support a conviction of distribution
of a counterfeit substance under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1986)
on the grounds that:

(1) the use of slang terms to describe

specifically defined substances is inexact and confusing, and (2)
the statute governing the distribution of counterfeit substances
is unconstitutionally vague.
The Utah Supreme Court has established the standard of
appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence needed to support
a jury verdict in a criminal case.

In State v. Booker, 709 P.2d

342, 345 (Utah 1985), the Court stated:
[W]e review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict of the jury. We reverse a jury
conviction for insufficient evidence only
when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted.
In reviewing the conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.

"It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility

of the witnesses . . . . M . .

.

So long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of
all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. . . .
(citations omitted).

See also State v. Pacheco, 778 P.2d 26, 30

(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
At trial the State presented two expert witnesses, Utah
State Narcotics Agent Patrick McCarthy and Utah State
Criminologist Kevin Lee Smith.

They testified to the use,

terminology and identification of controlled substances, in
particular the substance amphetamine.
Agent McCarthy, a 13 year veteran of narcotics
enforcement, testified to the prevailing street use of slang
terms to describe controlled substances over use of their
designated pharmaceutical names.

He unambiguously stated that

the terms "speed" and "cross tops," as used in his conversation
with defendant and in other drug transactions, referred to the
substance amphetamine.

Defendant argues that Agent McCarthy

testified that the terms "speed" and "cross tops" are
diametrically opposed.
record.

That assertion is not supported by the

The portion of the transcript in question reads a

follows:
A. [Agent McCarthy] . . . He [referring to
defendant] didn't state to me, "I don't have
any speed, but I have some cross tops." What
he stated was, "I have some cross tops at my
hotise that are my own personal ones, but it
has to be after the bar closes."
Q. [Defendant's Counsel] But you're sure he
didn't say, "I don't have any speed, but I do
have some cross-tops."
-6-

A. [Agent McCarthy] I know he didn't say
that because that would have stuck in my
mind. To me, those are diametrically opposed
terms.
(T. 62, 63). Read in context, it is clear that Agent McCarthy
meant that referring to "speed" and "cross tops" as different
substances would have stuck in his mind, that such identification
was diametrically opposed to his understanding of the meaning of
those terms.

As corroboration for his understanding that his

transaction with defendant involved amphetamines, Agent McCarthy
testified that defendant's quoted price of $20 for 200 (or $10
for 100) more tablets was a fair price for amphetamines and
indicated to him that defendant was offering amphetamines (T.
51).

Agent McCarthy's testimony concerning his conversations

with defendant and use of slang terminology was consistent and
clear throughout his examination at trial.
State Criminologist Kevin Lee Smith's testimony that if
a controlled substance appeared in a double scored tablet it
would be amphetamine compliments Agent McCarthy's testimony.
Agent McCarthy believed that his transaction with defendant
involved the controlled substance amphetamine by virtue of
terminology used and the physical appearance of the procured
tablets.

Mr. Smith confirmed that the physical appearance of the

tablets could lead one to believe that an amphetamine was
present.
The fact that the jury was persuaded by Agent
McCarthy's testimony and found defendant guilty of distribution
of a counterfeit substance carries great weight.

As noted supra,

an appellate court in this state will substitute its own judgment
for that of the jury "only when the evidence . . . is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted."
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345.

In the instant case, the evidence

presented fell well within the Utah Supreme Court standard and
was sufficient to support defendant's conviction.
Defendant also argues that the statute(s) governing
distribution of a counterfeit substance might be constitutionally
suspect.

However, defendant admits that he can find no support

for a constitutional challenge to the statute(s) in question.
Defendant cites State v. Moore, 674 P.2d 354 (Colo. 1984), a
Colorado case that upheld the constitutionality of that state's
statute governing controlled substances, in support of that
position.

Although the Colorado statute in question is

sufficiently dissimilar to the Utah statute to make any
meaningful comparison of the two untenable, the State agrees with
defendant that a constitutional attack on Utah Code Ann. § 58-378 (1986) or § 58-37-2(5) (Supp. 1987) (defendant never specifies
which statute might be constitutionally suspect) cannot be
supported.

There appear to be no Utah cases attacking the

constitutionality of either statute applicable to the instant
case.

However, the Utah Supreme Court has established standards

for reviewing the constitutionality of any statute.

In Trade

Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d 431, 436-37, 446
P.2d 958, 961-62 (1968), the Court held that a statute must
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clearly violate some constitutional provision, and further, the

violation must be clear, complete and unmistakable" and that in
examining statutory constitutionality the court must apply every
reasonable presumption favoring constitutionality in deference to
legislative prerogative to enact law.

See also State v. Tolman,

775 P.2d 422, 425 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied,
(Utah Oct. 24, 1989).

P.2d

Moreover, the "party attacking the

constitutionality of a statute must affirmatively demonstrate its
unconstitutionality."

Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681

P.2d 184, 191 (Utah 1984).

See also Tolman, 775 P.2d at 425.

Defendant's failure to meet his burden of affirmatively
demonstrating the statute's unconstitutionality, coupled with
this Court's deference to legislative prerogative, undermines
defendant's challenge.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm
defendant's conviction of distribution of a counterfeit
substance.
DATED this

' - "" day of December, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

^IjUAhfilClt't'lTirvJ

v^JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON
assistant Attorney General
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